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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In capitalist economies the owners of non-human assets are separate
from the owners of human assets in production. The prevalence of this
"outside ownership" arrangement suggests there are gains from assign-
ing ownership, or residual controls rights of assets to outsiders. This
paper develops a theory of outside ownership, where such an owner-
ship arrangement mitigates an external ﬁnance problem. Part of the
gains from outside ownership accrue to asset owners which determines
the asset value. As a result, asset values are conditional on an outside
ownership arrangement. I elaborate on this mechanism below.
This theory provides a context to analyze asset ownership and asset
values over project lifecycles. I model investment projects which are sub-
ject to "adjustment costs" in realizing the gains from outside ownership.
In frontier projects which appear every period, agents are constrained in
their investment, but as projects are repeated, outside ownership miti-
gates this underinvestment as assets can gradually implement more gains
from outside ownership. Project productivities are assumed to decrease
over time, and in equilibrium there is a continuous entry and exit of
projects.
Project speciﬁc asset values increase then decrease over time. At
ﬁrst, values increase as assets can implement greater gains through out-
side ownership, afterwards values decrease as the eﬀect of falling produc-
tivities dominates. Through rate of return equalization, the endogenous
income stream accruing to outside owners is negative when asset values
appreciate, and positive when asset values depreciate. The relatively
low income stream in early stages of projects is the opportunity cost of
creating assets which can implement the gains from outside ownership.
These indirect costs of asset creation are distinct from the direct mate-
rial costs of assets, and the evolution of asset values they imply reﬂects
an evolution of Tobin’s q: the excess of asset values over their material
cost.
T h ea n a l y s i ss h e d sl i g h to nw h y( i )t e c h n o l o g ys p e c i ﬁc assets take
time to peak in value, and (ii) why the source of these delays are changes
in Tobin’s q. Consistent with this observation, Greenwood and Jovanovic
2(1999) and Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001) argue that the arrival of the
IT revolution in the early 1970s initially depressed the aggregate stock
market before causing it to rise in the mid 1980s. Laitner and Stolyarov
(2003) document that this delayed peak arose from changes in average
Tobin’s q, rather than changes in aggregate physical investment. They
explain there are adjustment costs in accumulating technology speciﬁc
"intangible capital" which takes the form of proprietary knowledge. I
model a particular form of proprietary knowledge associated with real-
izing the gains from outside ownership.1
In periods when asset values appreciate, production yields a joint
product of goods and asset value. The component of assets associated
with asset appreciation is initially owned by insiders (providers of human
assets in production) then sold to outsiders. This incremental increase
in asset value is falling as a share of total value. As a result, the share of
asset value under outside ownership increases gradually over the lifecycle.
A stylized fact is that while young ﬁrms using newer technologies tend
to be owner managed, older ﬁrms using older technologies are outside
owned. Even among publicly listed ﬁrms, Mikkelson, Partch and Shah
(1997) document an increasing trend in the share of outside ownership
over time.
In sum, the twin predictions of (i) increasing outside ownership of
assets and (ii) the delayed peak in asset values over project lifecycles
are the empirical targets of this paper. These predictions are set in a
context where asset values are conditional on the outside ownership of
assets.
I now elaborate on the key mechanisms of the model. Consider a
two period project where an agent invests in skills in the ﬁrst period
to realize output in the second period together with a project speciﬁc
asset. The skills acquired in the ﬁrst period are asset speciﬁc: a ﬁxed
1Moreover, among publicly listed ﬁrms, young ﬁrms (who are more likely to use
new technologies) are less likely to pay dividends than older ﬁrms. For instance,
Pastor and Veronesi (2002) document that only 28% of listed ﬁrms pay dividends in
their ﬁrst year, and even 10 years after listing only 51% of ﬁrms do. This suggests
investors anticipate assets associated with new technologies to appreciate more in
value.
3quantity of output cannot be realized without the asset. In the ﬁrst
p e r i o d ,t h ea g e n ti sc r e d i tc o n s t r a i n e db e c a u s eh ec a n n o tc o m m i tt o
repay loans made against second period output, and the marginal return
on his investment is greater than the market interest rate. Assume the
scrap value of the asset is zero.
In this setup, assigning ownership of assets to an outsider can improve
outcomes. In the second period of the project, just before output is
realized, the owner can use her control rights to hold-up the agent, and
extract output which cannot be realized without the asset. This second
period hold-up is anticipated in the ﬁrst period. When the asset owner
competes to attract the agent to her project in the ﬁrst period, she
must oﬀer transfers to the agent. This transfer is set at a level which
would make the agent indiﬀerent between working for the asset owner
or pursuing an outside option in period one. The combination of ex post
hold-up and ex ante competition to attract agents implements transfers
from the owner to agent which resembles a loan. Because agents are
credit constrained in their investment in period one, outside ownership
is superior to self ownership of assets.2
The agent’s outside option is at least what he would get from the
project under self ownership of the asset. Suppose this is his outside
option. Since agents are credit constrained under self ownership, the
level of transfer in period one which would make the agent indiﬀerent
between working for the asset owner or self ownership, is less than the
discounted value of the output extracted through hold-up in the second
period. The diﬀerence between the period one transfer and discounted
output extracted through hold-up is that component of the asset value
which is conditional on outside asset ownership.
The transfers implemented through outside ownership is an inferior
substitute for a loan collateralized by an output level equal to that ex-
tracted through hold-up. Competing lenders would oﬀe ral o a ni np e r i o d
one equal to the discounted output level. However, such a loan cannot
2Felli and Roberts (2002) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) look at how the com-
bination of ex post hold up and ex ante competition can nullify the incentives to
underinvest associated with ex post hold up. In my model the combination of these
forces actually improves outcomes.
4exist, because agents cannot commit to repay loans after the second pe-
riod output is realized. Outcomes through such loans and outside asset
ownership diﬀer because two or more lenders can compete to oﬀer the
loans above, but only one asset can implement the gains from outside
ownership described.
In sum, there are gains from outside asset ownership when credit
constrained agents can use assets to commit to being held up ex post.
When assets which can implement such gains are scarce, they have value
conditional on outside ownership.
The second innovation of this paper is to consider the creation and
destruction of such assets over project lifecycles. Two period projects
are carried out by two period lived agents and projects can be repeated
over time. New projects arrive each period and project productivities
fall over time. The key to the gains from outside ownership are the level
of output which agents can commit to being held up. The evolution of
this commitment constraint is set as follows: the execution of a project
up to some output level, allows agents to be held up to that output level
in future repetitions of the project. This characterizes an adjustment
cost of realizing the gains from outside ownership.
In frontier projects, there are no gains from outside ownership and
agents are self employed. Over time, agents can commit a greater level
of output to hold up, which implements greater investment and output.
A by-product of ever greater output is in turn a greater level of com-
mitment to being held up, and consequently a greater asset value. Since
productivity is falling over time, the marginal increase in the asset value
is falling. This marginal increase in asset value is initially owned by the
investing agent or "insider", and sold to outsiders after production. As a
result, the insider share of assets is falling over time from full ownership
until it reaches zero.
Once this latter stage is reached, outsiders with full asset ownership
implement unconstrained levels of investment, and oﬀer agents lifetime
earnings equal to their outside option. Asset values decrease over time,
and eventually projects become so unproductive they are discontinued.
This paper adopts the Grossman-Hart-Moore deﬁnition of asset own-
5ership as conferring the right to control assets in contractually unspeci-
ﬁed situations.3 In an environment of incomplete contracts, the identity
of asset owners matters when asset speciﬁc investments are being made,
and asset owners can hold up other agents who have sunk asset speciﬁc
investments. A series of closely related models of outside ownership in
this context have been developed by Chui (1998), De Meza and Lock-
wood (1998), and Rajan and Zingales (1998).
Unlike these models, my theory of outside ownership focuses on its
role in overcoming external ﬁnancing problems. A robust empirical fea-
ture of the self employed (who cannot exploit the gains from outside
ownership) is that they are credit constrained. In particular, Evans and
Jovanovic (1989) and Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen (1994) ﬁnd agents
endowed with greater wealth are more likely to become self emplyed.
The stationary equilibrium displays project entry and exit as in the
canonical model of Hopenhayn (1992). In that paper, new projects incur
a ﬁxed entry cost to create an unspeciﬁed input, which in equilibrium,
earns positive discounted returns equal to the entry cost. The unspeciﬁed
i n p u tm u s ta l s ob es e r v i c e db yaﬁxed continuation cost to allow projects
to continue. The ﬁxed entry and continuation cost ensure an equilibrium
with entry and exit exists. My analysis provides a particular interpre-
tation of this unspeciﬁed input: assets which implement the gains of
outside ownership. I endogenize the "entry" or creation cost of these
assets, while their endogenous "continuation cost" corresponds to the
transfers oﬀered to young agents to participate in continuing projects.
A large literature has studied the role of incentive compatible debt
contracts in ﬁrm dynamics. Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2003) study
limited enforeability and ﬁrm dynamics extending models by Thomas
and Worral (1994) and Hart and Moore (1994, 1998). Quadrini (2000),
DeMarzo and Fishman (2001) and Clementi and Hopenhayn (2002)
study asymmetric information and ﬁrm dynamics. A wider class of
general equilibrium models which study the role ﬁnancial frictions in
the macroeconomy includes Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and
3Two well known papers are Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore
(1990).
6Moore (1997), and Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini (2003). A missing
component of this literature is the role of outside asset ownership as a
substitute form of external ﬁnance, and the interplay between outside
ownership and debt in generating observed ﬁrm dynamics. This paper
attempts to shed some light on these issues.
The next section presents the basic model. Section 3 discusses equi-
librium and Section 4 discusses comparative statics. The last section
concludes.
2M o d e l
Consider an overlapping generations economy with a constant popula-
tion of two period lived agents normalized to 2. Ex ante identical agents
have preferences over their young and old period consumption cy ≥ 0
and c0 ≥ 0 given by,
u = cy + βc0 β ∈ (0,1) (1)
2.1 Technology
In every period a new set of two period projects arrive exogenously to
the economy. Projects can be repeated each period so that period two
of a project and period one of its repetition overlap. Let τ ∈ {0,1,...}
index the age or vintage of a project relative to a frontier project. A
vintage τ − 1 project in the current period becomes a vintage τ project
i nt h en e x tp e r i o d .T h e r ei sn ou n c e r t a i n t y .
A key feature of the technology is a distinction between repeated
and non-repeated projects across vintages. The input-output matrix for
av i n t a g eτ − 1 repeated project beginning in period t − 1 is:
7Input Output
Period 1 1 unit labor iτ−1,t−1 project
iτ−1,t−1 project speciﬁc skills
speciﬁc investment
Period 2 1 unit labor δ
τF(iτ−1,t−1,n τ,t)
+iτ−1,t−1 skills goods
+nτ,t workers +1 project speciﬁc
+1 project speciﬁc asset seasoned by
asset seasoned sτ,t =m a x{iτ−1,t−1,s τ−1,t−1}
by sτ−1,t−1
or 1 unit labor δ
τF(iτ−1,t−1,n τ,t)−
+iτ−1,t−1 skills δ
τF(sτ−1,t−1, ˜ nτ,t) goods
+(nτ,t− ˜ nτ,t) workers +1 project speciﬁc
+1 unseasoned asset asset seasoned by
at cost zero (iτ−1,t−1 − sτ−1,t−1)
if iτ−1,t−1 ≥ sτ−1,t−1
and zero otherwise
A repeated project has a history of production which is summa-
rized by the level of investment undertaken in previous executions of
the project. This index of history is embodied in the seasoning of the
project speciﬁc asset. Every repeated project can use the seasoned asset
or a generic unseasoned asset in period two. The use of a generic asset
implies only the marginal output resulting from investments in excess of
the level of seasoning can be realized. To sum, repeated projects must
use assets from past executions of the project to realize the full output
from the project. The history of a project captured by asset seasoning
sτ−1,t−1, determines the degree to which skill investments in the project
are asset speciﬁc.4
In non-repeated projects, there is no history and no seasoned assets.
4One way to justify this assumption is that all investment in projects is latently
asset speciﬁc. The execution of projects up to an output level reveals to potential
outside owners the assets upon which speciﬁc investments are made.
8By construction all frontier τ−1=0projects are non-repeated. I assume
the material cost of assets is zero.5 Assets must be in place in period
one of a project for use in period two, and there is no asset depreciation.







τ,t where φ + α<1,δ∈ (0,1) (2)
where δ ∈ (0,1) implies productivity is falling in vintage. Output is
constant returns to scale with respect to the agent acquiring skills, skill
level, workers and asset. The technology is Leontieﬀ in that skilled
agents and assets are matched one to one.
Workers are hired from competitive labor markets at wage wt ≥ 0.
Deﬁne,








This is the maximized income in the second period net of worker wages,
when investment iτ−1,t−1 has already been sunk.
Let Vτ,t(sτ,t) ≥ 0 denote the asset value of a vintage τ asset seasoned
by skill level sτ,t in period t. Zero material costs of assets means Vτ,t(0) =
0 ∀τ,t.
The income of a project net of worker wages is:
Income net of workers
Period 1 −iτ−1,t−1 − Vτ−1,t−1(sτ−1,t−1)
Period 2 πτ,t(iτ−1,t−1,w t)+Vτ,t(sτ,t)
with seasoned asset
or πτ,t(iτ−1,t−1,w t) − πτ,t(sτ−1,t−1,w t)
+Vτ,t(sτ,t) − Vτ,t(sτ−1,t−1)
with unseasoned asset
In the timing of events, agents produce, then conduct asset transac-
tions, and ﬁnally consume.
The contractual environment is as follows. Period two project spe-
ciﬁc skill and output levels are non-veriﬁable. Any borrowing in the ﬁrst
5This assumption diﬀerentiates the model from existing vintage capital models
where new and old vintages coexist because the material costs of old vintage assets
have already been sunk.
9period of the project must be collateralized by veriﬁable values. Then,
the only source of borrowing available to the economy is that collater-
alized by the resale value of assets. Market trades verify the value of
these assets. Borrowing takes the form of a typical debt contract. If
repayment fails to take place after production, then lenders have the
right to liquidate the collateralized assets.
To complete the description of the technology, let µτ,t denote the
period t proportion of old agents who are skilled in vintage τ.
2.2 Outside ownership of assets
Asset ownership confers the right to control assets in situations that are
not contractually speciﬁed. In the incomplete contractual environment
described above, asset ownership structures matter when asset owners
threaten to conﬁscate assets from other agents who provide inputs which
are asset speciﬁc. The production technology speciﬁe so n l yo n et y p eo f
asset speciﬁc input: project speciﬁc skills up to the level at which assets
are seasoned.
When the agent who embodies these skills is also the asset owner, he
simply receives the net income from the project each period.
When the skilled agent and asset owner are separate individuals out-
comes become very diﬀerent. In the second period of the project, just
before output is realized, the two parties must bargain over the surplus of
the bilateral match between the asset and speciﬁcally skilled labor. The
bilateral match yields πτ,t(iτ−1,t−1,w t)+Vτ,t(sτ,t). The outside option of
the asset owner is Vτ,t(sτ−1,t−1), since outside the match, the seasoning
of the asset through production is not realized. The outside option of
the skilled agent is,
max{πτ,t(iτ−1,t−1,w t) − πτ,t(sτ−1,t−1,w t)+Vτ,t(sτ,t) − Vτ,t(sτ−1,t−1),w t}
(4)
The skilled agent has the option of earning the (i) income from the
project with an unseasoned asset or (ii) becoming a worker.
The income of the bilateral match minus the outside option of the
10skilled agent and asset owner equals the match surplus,
min{πτ,t(sτ−1,t−1,w t),πτ,t(iτ−1,t−1,w t) − wt + Vτ,t(sτ,t) − Vτ,t(sτ−1,t−1)}
(5)
Assume that in bargaining negotiations, the outside owner has full
bargaining power and fully extracts the match surplus. Then the period




























if agent’s outside option is becoming a worker
Rt denotes the market interest factor. The terms in the square brackets
are simply the match surpluses from (5). The asset equations are no
arbitrage conditions in competitive asset markets.
If agents’s outside option is using unseasoned assets, the second pe-
riod match surplus is πτ,t(sτ−1,t−1,w t).I n t h e ﬁrst period, the asset
owner has to attract a young agent to work with his asset. This involves
oﬀering a transfer to the young agent xτ−1,t−1 ≥ 0.x τ−1,t−1 ≥ sτ−1,t−1
since investments up to sτ−1,t−1 are fully appropriated by the owner.
Note by construction, agents are necessarily self employed in frontier
projects so x0,t−1 =0 .
If agents’s outside option is becoming a worker, the second period
match surplus is [πτ,t(iτ−1,t−1,w t) − wt + Vτ,t(sτ,t) − Vτ,t(sτ−1,t−1)], in the
ﬁrst period, the asset owner also has to attract a young agent to work
with his asset. This involves oﬀering transfer to the young agent xτ−1,t−1 ≥
0.x τ−1,t−1 ≥ iτ−1,t−1 since investments up to iτ−1,t−1 are fully appro-
priated by the owner. Since the agent has to be made indiﬀerent be-
tween working for the owner and becoming a worker, it follows that
xτ−1,t−1 − iτ−1,t−1 = wt−1 : agents have an earnings proﬁle identical to
workers. Since outside owners are not credit constrained, they can invest
11optimally in projects where skilled agents outside option is becoming a
worker.
Remark 1 In projects where skilled agents’s outside option is the worker
wage, investments are unconstrained. Conversely, constrained invest-
ment implies skilled agents’s outside option is producing with an unsea-
soned asset.
Outside ownership is superior to self ownership. Under self owner-
ship, the investment constraint of agents is,




Self employed agents can only borrow against the resale value of assets.
Such agents are better oﬀ using unseasoned assets. Given this, self em-
ployed agents are best oﬀ entering frontier projects since δ ∈ (0,1).A s
long as employed agents are oﬀered lifetime earnings equal to self em-
ployed agents in frontier projects, outside ownership is superior to self
ownership. This latter condition is ensured by the participation con-
straint across occupations characterized for an equilibrium below.
At the end of each project the share of assets under outside ownership
is given by
Vτ−1,t(sτ−1,t)
Vτ,t(sτ,t) ∈ [0,1]. When projects increase the seasoning
of assets, the marginal increase in asset values associated with this is
initially owned by insiders: agents who acquire project speciﬁc skills.
3 Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium requires in every period (i) an ownership
structure of assets and (ii) young agents’s choice of occupation, vintage
and consumption to maximize lifetime utility subject to the borrowing
constraint, earnings across occupations and vintage, the interest factor,
and (iii) labor market clearing condition and asset and credit market
clearing condition. I restrict the analysis to steady state outcomes where
earnings levels, the interest factor, the distribution of labor across oc-
cupations and ownership structure of assets are invariant across time:
wt = w, πτ (iτ−1,t−1,w t)=πτ (iτ−1,w),V τ,t(sτ,t)=Vτ(sτ), 1
Rt = 1
R,
µτ,t = µτ. Time subscripts are dropped.
12Ex ante identical agents enter diﬀe r e n to c c u p a t i o n sa sl o n ga st h e i r
lifetime earnings are equalized across occupations. There are three cat-
egories of occupations: (i) workers, (ii) agents entering projects where
their outside option in period two is becoming a worker, and (iii) agents
entering projects where their outside option is producing with an unsea-
soned asset. The ﬁrst two occupation have identical earnings proﬁles of
w each period. Then the participation constraint across occupation and





=−iτ−1 + xτ−1 +
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for ∀τ − 1 with positive entry by young agents whose outside option
when old is producing with the unseasoned asset. Such agents receive
xτ−1 from outside owners in youth, make the investment iτ−1, and enjoy
income equal to their outside option in the second period of the project.
These agents face the borrowing constraint speciﬁed, since they can-
not commit to repay against their second period earnings. The only
resources available for investment are (i) the transfers from asset own-
ers and (ii) the discounted marginal asset value which these agents can
borrow against. Borrowing by such agents against the marginal asset
value constitutes the only instance of debt used in the economy. When
borrowing constraints bind, the lifetime utility of these agents in given
by: 1
R [πτ(iτ−1,w) − πτ(sτ−1,w)].
Let i∗
τ−1 denote the ﬁrst best or unconstrained level of investment in
vintage τ − 1.i ∗









From Remark 1, if investment is constrained, the outside option of skilled
agents producing with an unseasoned asset.
Investment levels are determined by the investment rule.
13Investment Rule: The investment level for iτ−1, ∀τ − 1 ≥ 0 with







(πτ(ˆ ıτ−1,w) − πτ(ˆ ıτ−2,w)) (10)
if i∗
τ−1 −ˆ ıτ−1 > 0, and iτ−1 = i∗
τ−1 otherwise.
The investment rules solve for the investment levels as a function
of the worker wage ˆ ıτ−1(w),i ∗
τ−1(w). The key to how much constrained
investment is undertaken is given by the outside option of young agents.
This is because asset owners are only willing to provide agents with
enough investment funds to make agents indiﬀerent between working for
them or pursuing their outside option.
Lemma 1
Let P denote youngest vintage with unconstrained investment,
iP−1 = i∗
P−1.
(i) iτ−1 =ˆ ıτ−1 ∀ τ − 1 <P− 1,i τ−1 = i∗
τ−1 ∀ τ − 1 ≥ P − 1.
(ii) Constrained investmentsˆ ıτ−1 rising in w and vintage, and (ˆ ıτ−1−ˆ ıτ−2)
increasing in vintage⇒ sτ = iτ−1.
(iii) Unconstrained investments i∗
τ−1 falling in w and vintage⇒
sτ = sτ−1.
(iv) P falling in w.
Proof. Part (i) follows from δ ∈ (0,1) and the seasoning rule (??).
From (9) it is clear that i∗
τ−1 = i∗
τ−1(w) decreasing in w and vintage
since δ ∈ (0,1).w+ 1
Rw = 1
Rπ1(ˆ ı0,w) implies ˆ ı0(w) is increasing in w,
di0
dw > 0. 1
Rπ1(ˆ ı0,w)= 1
R (π2(ˆ ı1,w) − π2(ˆ ı0,w)) deﬁnes ˆ ı1 =ˆ ı1(ˆ ı0,w).




























Since the worker share of output is constant from the Cobb Douglas for-
mulation, π1(ˆ ı0,w)
φ
1−φ = n1(ˆ ı0,w)w = −
∂π1(ˆ ı0,w)
∂w w; the second equality

















dw > 0. By iteration, all constrained investments are
increasing in w. The investment rules even imply constrained invest-
ments are accelerating in vintage (ˆ ıτ−1 −ˆ ıτ−2) > (ˆ ıτ−2 −ˆ ıτ−3) due to
δ ∈ (0,1) and diminishing marginal returns. Finally, P is falling in w,
since i∗
τ−1(w) −ˆ ıτ−1(w) is falling in w.
Recall the share of assets under outside ownership is given by
Vτ(sτ−1)
Vτ(sτ) .
In projects with constrained investment sτ = iτ−1 >s τ−1 = iτ−2 so
there is some increase in asset seasoning and partial inside ownership of
assets. In projects with unconstrained investment sτ = sτ−1, so there is
full outside ownership of assets.

















Combining the no arbitrage asset price conditions (4) with the partic-











for ∀τ − 1 with positive entry by young agents. This is a familiar rela-
tionship which says that the asset price is equal to the discounted sum
of project dividends. The level of asset seasoning aﬀects the asset value
through iτ−1 = iτ−1(sτ−1).
The terminal vintage T, is deﬁned as the youngest non-frontier vin-
tage such that VT(sT)=0 . Substituting into (12), the following inequal-
ities must hold for T,
15DT−1(iT−1,w)≥0 (13)
DT(iT,w)<0
The dividend must be non-negative for the penultimate vintage, and
negative for the terminal vintage.
From (12), the free entry of assets V0(0) = 0, implies the following






The discounted value of net incomes over project lifetimes sum to zero.
This condition, the T investment equations and the terminal vintage
conditions solve for the T investment levels {iτ−1}
T−1
τ−1=0,t e r m i n a lv i n t a g e
T and worker wage w.
Lemma 2 In an equilibrium where w>0,
(i) Skilled agents must coexist in vintages 1 to T.
(ii) The terminal vintage is ﬁnite T<∞.
(iii) Investment in the frontier vintage must be constrained
i0 =ˆ ı0 ⇒ T ≥ 2.
Proof. (i) By construction, Vτ(sτ) > 0 ∀1 ≤ τ ≤ T − 1, so it is
worthwhile to implement projects from (12). (ii) For w>0, there must
exist a T<∞.
(iii) Suppose not, so these agents can borrow 1
RV1(i0) > 0 to ﬁnance
investment i0 ≤ 1
RV1(i0), such that i0 = i∗
0. Since δ ∈ (0,1), the partic-
ipation constraint (8) and terminal vintage conditions (13) imply that
T =1and V1(i0)=0which is a contradiction.
Given values for {iτ−1}
T−1
τ−1=0 ,T,w,the equilibrium Vτ(sτ) values are
determined from (12). The equilibrium values of Vτ(sτ−1) are determined
by modifying the constrained investment rules (9) for the lower level of
seasoning. The level of transfers to young agents xτ, is determined from
(8) given Vτ(sτ),V τ(sτ−1),{iτ−1}
T−1
τ−1=0 ,T,w.
Since unseasoned assets are only used in frontier projects, the density
16of skilled agents across coexisting vintages must be uniform, µτ = µ ∀1 ≤
τ ≤ T. Given values for {iτ−1}
T−1
τ−1=0 ,T,w, the labor market clearing







On the left hand side is the demand for workers summed across vintage
divided by 2 since only half of the workers are old. On the right hand
side is the population of old minus the population of non-workers.
Finally in the credit market, the linear preferences of agents from
(1) imply R = 1
β as long as the young as a group are not constrained
in their lending and asset transactions. I assume throughout that this
holds (that is, the population of workers is large in the economy).6
Proposition 1
(i) A non-degenerate equilibrium exists where
w>0,{iτ−1}
T−1
τ−1=0 > 0 and T<∞.
(ii) A degenerate equilibrium exists where
w = {iτ−1}
∞
τ−1=0 =0and T = ∞.
(iii) If young agents are born with endowment ε>0,
the non-degenerate equilibrium is unique.
Proof in Appendix.
In the analysis which follows outcomes for the non-degenerate equi-
librium are discussed.
3.1 Properties of equilibrium
Proposition 2
(i) ∃ a Q ≤ T such that, the dividend Dτ−1(iτ−1,w) is increasing in
vintage ∀ τ − 1 ≤ Q, and decreasing in vintage ∀ τ − 1 >Q .
6Deﬁne wP−1 ≡ xP−1 + 1
R [VP(iP−1) − Vτ(iP−2)] − iP−1,t h ee a r n i n g sn e to f
investment of an agent entering the youngest vintage with unconstrained investment.


















the equilibrium interest factor is R = 1
β.
17(ii) When investment is constrained, Dτ−1(iτ−1,w) is decelerating in
vintage. Let P denote the youngest vintage such that investment is
unconstrained. Then, Dτ(iτ,w) − Dτ−1(iτ−1,w)
is falling in τ for ∀ τ ≤ P .
(iii) When investment is not constrained, Dτ−1(iτ−1,w) is
falling and accelerating in vintage. That is,
Dτ(iτ,w) − Dτ−1(iτ−1,w) < 0
is increasing in τ for ∀ τ>P≥ Q.
Proof in Appendix.
3.1.1 Asset values over the lifecycle
[Figure 1] summarizes the lifecycle of vintage speciﬁc asset values and
net incomes. From the asset price equations (12), the growth of asset
prices is,
Vτ(sτ)−Vτ−1(sτ−1)=−[−iτ−1 + βπτ(iτ−1,w) − (w + βw)]+(1 − β)Vτ(sτ)
(16)
This combined with Proposition 2 implies asset prices ﬁrst increase then
decrease over the lifecycle of projects. The relatively low and negative
net incomes when assets appreciate in value can be interpreted as the cost
of creating assets which can implement the gains from outside ownership.
Successive repetitions of young projects increase the extent to which
agents acquiring project skills can expose themselves to being held up,
which in turn implements higher levels of constrained investment. Projects
with unconstrained investment are continued as long as the net income
from projects under outside ownership is positive. Note the project spe-
ciﬁc asset value must peak before net income but after the vintage at
which net income becomes positive.
3.1.2 Asset ownership over the lifecycle




(i) Agents are self employed in frontier projects,
V1(0)
V1(i0) =0 .
(ii) Outsiders own all assets once investment is unconstrained,
Vτ(sτ−1)








Figure 1: Asset values and net incomes over project lifecycles
(iii) The share of assets under outside ownership is increasing
in vintage ∀τ<P .










constrained investments, net incomes are increasing in investment levels,
and from the constrained investment rules, constrained investments are
increasing in the seasoning levels of assets used. These imply the gap
Vτ(iτ−1)−Vτ(iτ−2) must be falling in vintage. The latter in turn implies






The transition of asset ownership from inside to outside ownership
mirrors a transition of skills from general to asset speciﬁc skills as deﬁned
by Becker (1964). The share of acquired skills which are asset speciﬁc
is rising in vintage until skills become fully speciﬁc when there is full
outside asset ownership.
3.1.3 Debt versus outside ownership
While both debt and outside ownership of assets mitigate an external
ﬁnancing problem, outside ownership is an inferior substitute for debt.
19Under debt the borrower appropriates all the gains from trade whereas
under outside ownership, the gains from trade are divided between bor-
rower and asset owner, which results in a less eﬀective mitigation of
underinvestment.
In equilibrium, debt and outside ownership coexist in the model since
they implement transfers in period one of projects that are backed up
by diﬀerent components of period two project income. Outside owner-
ship allows agents to commit to make transfers of asset speciﬁcp e r i o d
two output πτ(iτ−1,w) through hold-up, which cannot be implemented
through debt. Meanwhile, agents in investment constrained projects use
the value of the newly seasoned component of assets [Vτ(sτ) − Vτ−1(sτ−1)]
as collateral for loans. This last observation implies that at the end of
each project, the share of debt in total asset value is exactly equal to
t h es h a r eo fa s s e t sw h i c ha r ei n s i d eo w n e d .
3.1.4 The role of adjustment costs
In the analysis, asset seasoning is limited by the extent to which projects
have been implemented in the past. Suppose there is no such adjustment
cost to asset seasoning so that agents can commit any level of period
two output to hold up. Given the assumption of zero asset material
costs, the resulting outcome is straightforward. Only frontier projects
are undertaken, with unconstrained levels of investment i0 = i∗
0, and
the value of assets owned by outsiders is zero, V0 =0 . The latter reﬂects
that with zero material costs and no adjustment costs to asset seasoning,
none of the gains from outside ownership accrue to asset owners.
Suppose assets now carry a material cost V0 = K>0. Then from the
logic of vintage physical capital models, non-frontier projects can coexist
with frontier projects. Asset owners will command a discounted income
stream which in equilibrium is equal to the material cost of assets. Thus,
once positive material costs are introduced, some of the gains from out-
side ownership accrue to asset owners. However this framework cannot
generate a delayed peak in project speciﬁc asset values, nor explain how
asset values can exceed their material costs. Since all assets are owned
by outsiders, such an analysis cannot explain the gradual transition of
20asset ownership from insiders to outsiders either.
4C o m p a r a t i v e s t a t i c s
4.1 Imperfect seasoning
The main analysis assumed that this period’s output determined the
level of output extracted through hold up in next period’s repetition of
the project. More generally, the level of asset seasoning may not have
this one to one mapping. Here I compare economies with diﬀerent levels
of asset seasoning. The asset seasoning rule is modiﬁed to,
sτ,t =m a x{θiτ−1,t−1,s τ−1} where θ ∈ [0,1] (17)
The equilibrium conditions aﬀected are the constrained investment rules,
w + βw = β (πτ(ˆ ıτ−1,w) − πτ(θˆ ıτ−2,w)) (18)
Lowering θ acts as a subsidy to investment constrained agents relative
to workers. When young, such agents receive a lower level of transfers
from asset owners which in turn implies they implement a lower level of
investment.
For a given w,l o w e rθ implies lower levels of ˆ ıτ−1 ∀1 ≤ τ − 1 <P .
The level of output which agents can be held up is lower so outside
owners oﬀer less funds for investment to attract young agents to their
project. From (14) this implies equilibrium w must be lower to satisfy
the free entry constraint. Lowering w lowers the outside option of agents,
which leads to a further round of reductions in constrained investments
ˆ ıτ−1, and increases in unconstrained investments i∗
τ−1. These results are
summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 Consider two economies with diﬀerent degrees of
asset seasoning θ>θ
0. In the weak seasoning economy θ
0,
(i) All constrained investments are lowerˆ ıτ−1 > ˆ ı0
τ−1 for 0 ≤ τ−1 <P
and the youngest unconstrained vintage is older P ≤ P0.
(ii) The worker wage is lower w>w 0, and terminal vintage
older T<T 0.
21Proof. Given w>w 0 andˆ ıτ−1 > ˆ ı0
τ−1 implies P ≤ P0. From the terminal
vintage conditions w>w 0 implies T<T 0.
Since w is falling in θ, welfare is falling in θ. In particular, when θ =0 ,
the degenerate equilibrium is unique, and robust to the introduction of
an endowment ε>0 when the young are born.
4.2 Owner protection
T h em a i na n a l y s i sa s s u m e df u l lb a r g a i n i n gp o w e ro fo u t s i d eo w n e r so v e r
the match surplus. More generally, suppose their bargaining share is
given by λ ∈ [0,1]. After substituting in the share of match surplus ac-
cruing to agents acquiring skills, the participation constraint is modiﬁed
to,
w + βw (19)
=wτ−1 + β ((1 − λ)πτ(iτ−1,w)+λw)
=−iτ−1 + xτ−1 +
β [πτ(iτ−1,w) − λπτ(sτ−1,w)+Vτ(sτ) − Vτ(sτ−1)]
s.t.iτ−1 ≤xτ−1 + β [Vτ(sτ) − Vτ(sτ−1)]
Previously, setting λ =1meant that skilled agents, whose outside option
is becoming a worker, experience lifetime earnings identical to workers.
When λ ∈ [0,1), such agents earn a vintage speciﬁcw a g ewτ−1 <w ,
given the anticipated sharing of the match surplus with the owner.
The equilibrium conditions aﬀected are the constrained investment
rules,
w + βw = β (πτ(ˆ ıτ−1,w) − λπτ(ˆ ıτ−2,w)) (20)
Lowering λ acts as a subsidy to investment constrained agents relative
to workers. When young, such agents receive a lower level of transfers
from asset owners which in turn implies they implement a lower level of
investment.
Proposition 4 Consider two economies with diﬀerent degrees of
owner bargaining power λ>λ
0. In economy λ
0,
22(i) All constrained investments are lowerˆ ıτ−1 > ˆ ı0
τ−1 for 0 ≤ τ−1 <P
and the youngest unconstrained vintage is older P ≤ P0.
(ii) The worker wage is lower w>w 0, and terminal vintage
older T<T 0.
Proof. Same as Proposition 3.












Figure 2: Asset values and net incomes across vintage with diﬀerent
degrees of investor protection
In the context of models of debt, Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini
(2003) identify a general equilibrium mechanism where the arrival of
more productive technologies increases the outside option of entrepre-
neurs and thereby implements higher investments in credit constrained
projects. In my model this eﬀect is captured by the investment decision
rules for constrained investments. Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini then
show that countries with lower degrees of contract enforceability will ex-
hibit higher macroeconomic instability since a greater share of projects
are investment constrained. In my model lower owner protection ex-
pands the number of investment constrained vintages and would lead to
a similar prediction.
235C o n c l u s i o n
The literature on asset lifecycles, and Laitner and Stolyarov (2003) in
particular, has argued that adjustment costs to realizing asset speciﬁc
proprietary gains can explain the delay between the arrival of tech-
nologies and the peak in Tobin q values of technology speciﬁc assets.
The form in which these proprietary gains and adjustment costs take
shape remains a black box. My paper shows when agents are credit
constrained, the asset speciﬁcity of skills combined with outside asset
ownership can mitigate underinvestment, and generate asset speciﬁcp r o -
prietary gains. In the context of this framework, the adjustment cost
which causes a delay in the peaking of such proprietary gains is the
gradual process through which the technology speciﬁc skills become as-
set speciﬁc.
By marrying the literature on asset lifecycles with my theory of out-
side ownership, the analysis generated a new prediction: the gradual
transition of asset ownership from inside to outside ownership.
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6A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . [INCOMPLETE] (i) Straightforward to
check. (ii) Consider the equation for the discounted stream of net in-
comes, where the investment levels are expressed as functions of w from




τ−1 ([−iτ−1(w)+βπτ(iτ−1(w),w)] − [w + βw])
In an equilibrium, this discounted sum equals zero from (14).
For investment constrained vintages, the net income can be rewritten
as [−ˆ ıτ−1 + βπτ(ˆ ıτ−1,w)]−[w + βw]=[ −ˆ ıτ−1 + βπτ(ˆ ıτ−2,w)] from (10).
















dw by a factor related to the
ratios of marginal productivity of investments across constrained vin-
tages. Thus, when w and constrained investments are small, the mar-
ginal productivity of investment is very large but the ratio of marginal
26productivity of investments is small, so net incomes are increasing in
vintage for constrained vintages. Also, when w is small, the youngest
unconstrained vintage is very old. Thus, the discounted stream of net
i n c o m e si si n c r e a s i n gi nw in the neighborhood of w =0 .
Eventually, the discounted stream of net incomes must be falling in
w as (i) the youngest unconstrained vintage P is falling in w and (ii)
the marginal productivity of investment becomes smaller relative to the
ratio of marginal productivity of investments. There exists a unique
w>0, which equates the discounted stream of net incomes to zero. The






Figure 3: Discounted net incomes as a function of w.
(iii) If an endowment ε>0 is given to the young upon birth, the dis-
counted stream of net incomes is positive for w =0 . Then the degenerate
outcome is not an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Begin by showing that a sequence of
net income falling in vintage must be followed by a similar sequence,
[−iτ−1 + βπτ(iτ−1,w)] ≤ [−iτ−2 + βπτ−1(iτ−2,w)] ⇒ [−iτ + βπτ+1(iτ,w)] ≤
[−iτ−1 + βπτ(iτ−1,w)]. Suppose not, then [−iτ−1 + βπτ(iτ−1,w)] ≤ [−iτ−2 + βπτ−1(iτ−2,w)]
and [−iτ + βπτ+1(iτ,w)] > [−iτ−1 + βπτ(iτ−1,w)]. T h el a s ti n e q u a l i t y
can only be true if investment iτ−1 is constrained.
Case 1: First suppose investment iτ =ˆ ıτ is also constrained. The
relation implies,
[−ˆ ıτ−1 + βπτ(ˆ ıτ−1,w)] − [−ˆ ıτ−2 + βπτ−1(ˆ ıτ−2,w)]
<[−ˆ ıτ + βπτ+1(ˆ ıτ,w)] − [−ˆ ıτ−1 + βπτ(ˆ ıτ−1,w)]
From Lemma 1, (ˆ ıτ−1 −ˆ ıτ−2) < (ˆ ıτ −ˆ ıτ−1), so the relation implies πτ(ˆ ıτ−1,w)−
πτ−1(ˆ ıτ−2,w) <π τ+1(ˆ ıτ,w) − πτ(ˆ ıτ−1,w). From the participation con-
straint among constrained agents it is known that πτ+1(ˆ ıτ,w)−πτ+1(ˆ ıτ−1,w)=
πτ(ˆ ıτ−1,w) − πτ(ˆ ıτ−2,w). Substituting in implies a contradiction given
δ ∈ (0,1).
27Case 2: Now suppose iτ = i∗
τ is not constrained. This means πτ+1(i∗
τ,w)−
πτ+1(ˆ ıτ−1,w) ≤ πτ(ˆ ıτ−1,w) − πτ(ˆ ıτ−2,w) which again implies a contra-
diction.
The proof is completed by observing that (i) net income is negative
in the frontier vintage from (14) (ii) positive in the terminal vintage, and
(iii) asset values are positive for intermediate vintages. This means that
a continued sequence of rising net incomes is followed by a continued
sequence of falling net incomes.
(ii) Case 1: First suppose investment iτ =ˆ ıτ is also constrained. The
argument used in part (i) can be directly used for the proof.
Case 2: Now suppose iτ = i∗
τ is not constrained. The argument used
in part (i) can be directly used for the proof.
(iii) When investment is unconstrained, net incomes must be falling
in vintage since δ ∈ (0,1).
28